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Abstract                                                       
Borno State is the only State in Nigeria that is bordered by three countries. These include Cameroon, Niger and 
Tchad Republic. There exist a healthy trade relationship between the State and her international neighbors. 
Hundreds of thousands tonnes of grains, livestock and other consumables flow between Borno and her bordering 
trading partners. Despite this advantage, the State depends on monthly allocation from the centre to keep it 
running. The scenario is further compounded by insurgency. This Study analyzed the effect of insurgency on the 
trade relationship between Borno State and her immediate neighbors. The study utilized both primary and 
secondary data. The primary data were generated through the administration well structured questionnaire and 
oral interview. conducted on 300 respondents from each of each of the State Local Government Areas (LGAs). 
The respondents were purposively selected. Interview was also conducted on traders in the two major grain 
markets in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council and Jere Local Government Area. Secondary data was obtained 
from various write ups with similar inclination. Simple descriptive method was used in the analysis of data. 
Study revealed that so far, the insurgency has claimed 28,209 lives. The number of people either abducted or 
missing stood at 2,751. It also revealed that prior to the insurgency, annual grain flow between Borno and her 
trade partners was 294,940 tonnes however, the flow of grain decreased to 94,500 tonnes by second quarter of 
2014. The magnitude of the decrease in the flow of grain as well as number of death recorded showed that 
religious insurgency affected all spectrum of the Borno State economy. Specifically all international trade routes 
were no more accessible. Agricultural activities grounded as farmlands, rivers and fish ponds were abandoned. 
The study also revealed that the major cause of the insurgency aside of corruption and arrogant display of 
affluence by the elitist class was unrealized political will. Study recommended that genuine development and 
appropriate integrative program should form basis for governance. 
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1. Introduction 
Borno State, on the international front is bordered by three countries namely: Niger, Tchad and Cameroon. These 
countries constitute major trading partner to the State in particular and Nigeria in general. Substantial amount of 
the Sstate’s livestock requirement comes from Tchad and Cameroon. Borno State also provides ready market for 
her neighboring countries in terms of agricultural produce. Thus, there is a buoyant cross-border trade between 
the State and her international neighbors. On the local front, the state is bordered by three states namely, 
Adamawa, Gombe and Yobe. Internally, the State is composed of 27 local government areas and each of these 
Local Government Areas (LGA) has peculiar market day’s arrangement with distinct traded products.  
The relationship between the people of Borno and those of her foreign neighbours pre-date Nigeria 
independence. It is pertinent to note that prior to the 1961 United Nation (UN) plebiscite, Borno State was part of 
Cameroon. The boundaries that separate the two countries are blurred due to the fact that families from both 
sides of the frontier interact as if there were no international demarcation (Balami 2006). From the Cameroon 
side there is Fotokol, Kolofata, Amchide and Achigachia that can easily be accessed through Ngala LGA. From 
Bama (Nigeria), traders/households can easily access Banki. There is Banki town in both side popularly known 
as Banki Nigeria and Banki Cameroon. So the movement of people is unhindered, which is a favorable condition 
for international trade. 
International trade allows for free movement of factors across border. This is also enhanced by 
ECOWAS protocol which permits free flow of goods and services within and between member nations. The 
compositions of items of trade between countries in the sub-region are basically agricultural products. These 
include millet, maize, sorghum, rice and livestock, in addition to great potentials in tourism and mineral 
resources. Thus, trade activities have been on the increase for quite some time between Borno, Niger, Tchad, and 
Cameroon. However, insurgency in the north eastern part of Nigeria may have altered the course of trade 
between these neighboring countries. 
Over the years, Nigeria has had her fare share of socio-economic disruption; Boko Haram in the North-
East; Kidnappings and Oil Pipelines Vandalism in the East and South/South; the Medical terrorism “EBOLA” in 
the West. Each and every one of these anti-social vices has disrupted economic activities in Nigeria. Of the 
aforementioned anti-social variables, religion induced crises seem to pose greater challenges in the study area. 
The major religious insurgency in the North Eastern part of Nigeria is the one championed by Boko 
Haram Sect. Prior to the advent of the religious sect, Borno State is noted for its boisterous international trade. 
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There exist healthy exchange of factors between the State and Niamey, Tillabari, Fada Gouma, Boi, Banki, 
Daso,Maradi, Zindar, Tahoua Nguelkolo, Parakon, e.t.c. The flow of livestock (cattle, goat, sheep, camel e.t.c ) 
and cash/crops, food (rice wheat groundnut gum Arabic sorgum e.t.c) to and from Borno state and her neighbors 
is unprecedented. This can be explained by the long historical ties between the ethnic nationalities in this region. 
The ethnic groups along the borders have the same sociological and anthropological characteristics and historical 
background (same language, religion and cultural belief) Balami (2000). However the bond of relationship and 
the trend of business flow is being hampered by the insurgency championed by Boko Haram. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
At a particular period in the history of Nigeria especially during the military era, the country witnessed serious 
economic crisis and political isolation. However, with the introduction of democratic government in 1999 the 
country was stabilizing albeit consciously. The peace and stability  witnessed his threatened by religious 
fanaticism induced insurgency, corruption, political and ideological intolerance, ethnic confrontation and others. 
 Prior to the religious fanaticism induced insurgency in Nigeria, various studies indicates that the main obstacles 
to trade between Nigeria and her neighbors include absence of law and order, high crime rate, inter-tribal and 
communal clashes, lack of business transparency and problem of payment for transaction. Little or no attention 
was given to the effect of religious insurgency on an economy. Events in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Libya etc have 
shown that the coming of religious insurgency has added to many obstacles to trade between countries. Thus, 
this study dwelt on the impact of insurgency on Borno state. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study  
The main objective of this study is to assess how Boko Haram insurgency that gained prominence in 2009 
affected the economy of Borno state. The specific objectives of the study were: 
i. examine the causes of insurgency;  
ii. determine the number of People killed/missing; 
iii. determine the number of Livestock killed or stolen; 
iv. determine the number of Buildings, Motor Cycles burnt/destroyed; 
v. determine the number of Market, Shop and places of Worship burnt; 
vi. examine the flow of Livestock between Borno and her neighbors (before/during        
                      insurgency); 
vii. estimate the volume of Grain traded through the boarders (before/during insurgency). 
 
1.4 Concept of Boko Haram: 
Boko Haram literally means “Western Education is divinely forbidden”. It is an Arabic/Hausa phrase that 
connotes Book (adulterated in pronunciation as Boko -Western Education); HARAM (anything forbidden in 
Islam). Thus the philosophy of the proponents of such belief is that acceptance and practice of western education 
as well as culture is a sin. In trying to buttress the sinful nature of western education/ culture; Yusuf (2009), 
opined that it is blasphemous for a believer to accept the logic that the world is sphere or that rain comes from 
water evaporation as a result of interaction with the sun. He was of the view that this position is mere evil 
machination of Western Education Philosophy in their bid to malign Islam. 
The fundamental ideology of Boko Haram is “Western Education is forbidden and therefore should not 
be allowed to prevail among nations; particularly, Muslim dominated states. Initially, they attack churches and 
law enforcement agents. As they increase in number and apparent slow response from the government, anybody, 
institutions in Nigeria irrespective of whom and where is subject to attack by the sect. In his contribution to the 
attacks by Boko Haram, Adetiloye (2014), opined that the group attacked and destroy churches, mosques, 
schools, police stations and private and public owned facilities. He concluded that Boko Haram is the most 
dangerous insurgent group in Nigeria. By their belief and activities it suggests that they are among the global 
terrorists network. They kidnap, engage in suicide bombing etc. supporting the claim that Boko Haram is a 
terrorist group, Ali etal (2012), said that the manifestation of terrorism include hijacking, suicide attack, self 
suicide bombing etc. which is the attack formula often adopted by the Boko Haram. These seem to suggest that 
the group is an affiliate of international terrorist network.  Their activities generate other adverse effects which 
include destabilization of regions, resource flows and market; the blossoming of transnational crime, 
humanitarian disasters, transnational terrorism (Metz 2007)  
The sect was founded by late Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri in 2002. The birth of the sect 
was an aftermath of disagreement with his spiritual leader, Late Shiekh Jafar Adam. It started as an Islamic 
Youth vanguard and later metamorphosed into huge religious organization with follower ship spread across 
Borno and Yobe states. The group later moved to Yobe state and settled in kanamma. Actually, what really 
brought the sect to lime-light was its choice of name for their newly acquired headquarter. They named the 
headquarters “AFGHANISTAN”. Barely after the naming, they attacked police out- post in kanamma. That set 
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the stage for attacks and incursion into the body polity of the people of Borno, Bauchi, Yobe and indeed Nigeria 
in general. 
Contrary to widely held belief that the group comprises only of kanuri ethnic group, membership of 
this sect cut across national and tribal line. Some of the members come from Tchad,Niger, Cameroon. Within 
Nigeria are the Hausas, Shuwa-Arabs,Gwoza: Ibira, Gamargu and host of other small tribes. 
The first major attack by the sect was recorded in July 2009 in Maiduguri. This attack led to the death 
of the leader and founder Sheikh Mohammed Yusuf with over seven hundred of his followers. After a lull in 
their activities, and the inability of the government to prosecute those who killed their spiritual leader and 
members, the sect under a new leader Iman Shakau Launched attacks on Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Bauchi. 
Ever since, the Socio- Economic activities in the aforementioned states are no longer the same. Their claim was 
retaliation for the extra-judicial killing of their members on the one hand and non introduction of sharia in 
Nigeria on the other. 
Socio- economic activities in Borno state since 2009 has witnessed considerable decline as people and 
properties have being subjected to attacks by the insurgents. Boko Haram killed many people and destroyed 
properties valued at over a billion dollars. They torched building, stole properties and thereby destroying 
livelihoods of farmers and forcing hundreds of business to close or relocate. The concentration of these sect in 
the Northern part of Nigeria that is noted for agricultural activities poses a threat to food security in the region in 
particular and Nigeria in general, (Pual, 2003). 
The effects of insurgency on an economy could be explained from many fronts. However, depending 
on the aims and objectives of the insurgents, government approach at tackling it, may expose the economy. For 
instance, government approach to curbing insurgency by closing international borders may affect the flow of 
commodities resulting to loss of revenue (Collier, 2003, Balami, 2000, O’ Neil 2005). In the same vain, 
imposition of curfew as well as multiple military/police check-point as a security measure restricts business 
transactions. 
On the side of agricultural sector, larger percentage of the population in LDCs are involved in farming, 
this include animal rearing. Insurgent destroyed large hectares of farmland. Also millions of livestock have been 
adversely affected. The fishing industry was also affected as over a million fishermen emigrated to safer places 
within the country or neighboring countries (Collier 2003, Merrick, 2014, Berdel & Kenn, 1997). 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Sources of Data  
The study utilized both primary and secondary data. The primary data was generated through the administration 
of oral interview. Interview was conducted on 300 respondents from the 27 Local Government Areas (LGAs) by 
five research assistant from each local government area. The oral interview was conducted on purposively 
selected respondents in the internally displaced people’s (IDPs) camps in Maiduguri provided by the Borno State 
government. Secondary data were obtained from the Borno State Internally Displaced Peoples’ Camps, 
Committee Reports and Journals. 
The sample size is based on number and frequency of attacks in a particular place. Those interviewed 
were ward Heads, Teachers, Imams, Pastors, Market Leaders. Others included staff of sanitation board, burial 
ground attendants, Civilian JTF members, Igbo and Yoruba cultural union leaders. Simple descriptive method 
was used to analyze the data generated.  
 
2.2 Sampling Technique  
Multistage sampling technique was employed for this study. The IDP camps were created by the Borno State 
Government to carter for the welfare of internally displaced people from the Boko haram annexed Local 
Government Areas. The camps were designated in such a manner to accommodate people from same local 
government area, however there are infusions of displaced persons in camps other than those provided for by the 
State. There are nine nine (9) main and three (three) satellite settlement camps; these camps with their allocated 
LGAs are: National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) camp (Damboa, Konduga and Marte); Legacy Building 
otherwise called Teachers Village (Kukawa, Baga and Ngala); Yerwa Government Girls Secondary School 
(YGGSS) ( Bama and Mafa); Sanda Kyarimi II (Dikwa, Bama and Baga); Government College (Gwoza, Chibok 
and Damboa); Federal Training Centre (FTC) (Konduga and Bama); Arabic Teachers’ College (ATC) (Gwoza, 
Askira/Uba and Kukawa); Government Girls College (GGC) (Bama, Monguno, Damboa and Chibok); and 
Mogolis (Monguno and Ngala). Thus, the first stage was to identify the LGAs that made up a particular IDP 
camp. Since there are pockets of IDPs infused in camps other than those provided for them, the IDP camps with 
the largest number of people from the same LGAs were considered to avoid duplication of information. The 
second stage involved random selection of 300 respondents from each LGA. The third stage was the random 
selection of respondents from of the IDP. 
3. Data Presentation and Analysis 
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3.1 Causes of Religious Insurgency 
Religion according to Oxford Learners Dictionary as used in Adeyemi (2006) is the belief in super human 
controlling power that is entitled to obedience and worship. The emphasis here is that of faith being controlled 
by unseen power that one is entitled to. Paraphrasing the definition further, it thus means that one is entitled to 
his/her religious belief; implying that no-one should super impose his/her belief unto others. Religion (faith) is 
an individual’s choice. The choice he/she believes will give him/her peace of mind on earth and salvation in the 
hereafter. 
The geneses of insurgency all over the world vary in nature and modus operandi; however, one thing is 
common, it is means of expressing resentment and deeper frustration. According to collier (2003), insurgency is 
a means of expressing a long and deeper exclusion and marginalization, people react over social and 
environmental harms imposed by the people or government. This reaction comes in many forms among which 
include rebellion and insurgency (Collier 2003; Michael, 2008; Marian & Hoffman 2004). 
According to Adeyemi (2006), one of the causes of crisis in Nigeria is that the political class lacks 
legitimacy. He linked this to their inability to bring about genuine development and appropriate integrative 
outlook for Nigeria. He opined that the political class use tribalism and manipulation of religious sentiments and 
regionalism to justify unequal development. The feeling of being unequally treated by the government leads to 
frustration which may further lead to rebellion, (Nwagu, 2014). Insurgency, restiveness, terrorism and the like 
are as a result of frustration and apathy among majority of the citizenry which often leads to unimaginable anti-
social activities. It has direct bearing on national integration especially where the insurgency is religion and/or 
economic driven (Ali et al., 2012, Berdel et al., 1997, UNODC, 2009, Watts, 2008). In this situation, people tend 
to identify with their belief which is the common cause that alienates them from others. The common cause may 
not be realistic but the belief in it is the driving force. Thus, driven by hatred for presumably ungodly people on 
the one hand and the goodies of hereafter on the other, was enough reason to rebel against the system. 
In every social setting, standard of living within and between social classes go a long way at ensuring 
social cohesiveness. Wide gap between rich and poor is early sign that brings class conflicts (Adetiloye, 2014, 
Gberie 2005). A country blessed with abundant wealth but only the privileged few benefit from the wealth of 
nation brings all sort of resentment.. In many countries where insurgency has gained ground there is pronounced 
gap between the haves and have not. For instance the genesis of Arab spring which originated from Tunisia was 
as a result of socio-economic deprivation. Also, in Nigeria, Boko Haram, Movement for the emancipation of 
Niger Delta (MEND) , Odua People Congress ((OPC)), MASSOB etc. owe their existence to inequality. Most of 
these movements owe their existence to socio-economic deprivations. In his contributions to the root causes of 
insurgency, Adetiloye (2014), opined that arrogant display of ostentatious lifestyle by the elitist class ill acquired 
wealth create hatred  especially among the poor. This line of thought was presented in Nwagu (2014) who 
attribute the cause of insurgency to control of valuable resources by powerful people thereby denying the less 
privilege access. The disadvantaged segments of the society thus resort to fighting to what they believed 
belonged to them. Thus, insurgency arises when a group decides that the gap between their political expectation 
and the opportunities afforded them is unacceptable and can only be remedied by force (Metz 2007). 
People tend to be averse to values different from theirs. The inability of an individual to accept and 
respect others values often lead to conflict. Depending on the social status of the individual concerned, for 
instance, a preacher with huge followership, a popular politician, local chieftain/war lord etc; Personal 
disagreement with others value may translate to huge social conflict. This is because they tend to manipulate the 
thinking of their followers. In this case, an individual micro-perception of faith becomes a catalyst upon which 
his followers react. More often than not, efforts to obliterate this line of selfish driven indoctrination have always 
been truncated by the beneficiaries. People with tremendous influence on others tend to manipulate their 
thinking thus making them tools of exploitation for religious intolerance (Adeyemi 2006, Ali etal 2010, Watts 
2008, Mechel 2008). 
Religious affiliation plays a very important part in the nation’s social solidarity especially in Africa. 
People tend to identify more with their faith envelope than with others. Believing that steadfastness in ones 
religious belief is all about distrust in spiritual inclination of others. Thus, there is mutual distrust across various 
religious groups even among people with same religious belief but different sect. The dominance of religion in 
Nigerian’s body polity could be traced to the coming of the colonial masters (Adeyemi 2006; Agbaje 1990). 
Religion played important part in chanting the course of governance during that period. Elaborating further on 
the rule of religion in the nation’s body polity, Adeyemi (2006) opined that the power of religion as a tool of 
political maneuvers at any point in time can not be over emphasized as it was often deployed as an instrument of 
pacification. 
Religious intolerance in Nigeria was exhibited in 1986 when the then military government announced 
that Nigeria would join the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). This announcement brought to fore the 
level of mistrust and suspicion existing between the adherent of Nigerian’s two major religion. The reaction was 
unprecedented so much so that the leadership of that era had to back-paddle. There is also the existing in-house 
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mistrust between various sect in the same religion, for instance, Shia Vs Sunni; Pentecostals Vs Catholic etc. At 
the regional level the sudden appearance of an Islamic sect known as maitatsine took intolerance to different 
level. The sect originated from Kano, later Maiduguri and Yola. Their main objective is to change existing 
ideology. The incursion of this sect in the body polity of Kano residents led to destruction of lives and properties 
(Mimiko 1995; Oduola 2000). With the demise of the maitatsine sect people of the region witnessed 
considerable peace. However, the coming of Boko Haram, once again brought religion to the front burner of 
Nigerian polity. In line with Adeyemi’s summation, the series of violent confrontation being witnessed at present 
is a demonstration of the fundamental problem of religion which has created acute insecurity in the land”. 
 
3.2 Cost of Insurgency on Borno State Economy 
The incursion of Boko Haram into the body polity of the Northeastern part of Nigeria led to monumental loss of 
lives and properties. The losses incurred by the State are presented in Table 1. In Table 4.1, information on the 
number of people killed/missing; livestock killed or stolen; buildings, Motor Cycles burnt/destroyed; market, 
Shop and places of Worship burnt and the flow of Livestock between Borno and her neighbor (before/during  
insurgency) were presented. 
Table 1: COST OF RELIGIOUS INSURGENCY ON LIVES AND PROPETIES (2009-Mid 2014) 
 
Source: Borno State IDP Committee, (2013) & Field Survey,   (2014). Where: 
kl-M= number of males killed, kl-F= number of females killed, TPk = total number of people killed, 
MSn_M= number of male missing, MSn_F= number of female missing, Tot_MSn-P=total number of missing 
people, LS-K/S= total number of livestock killed/stolen, GB=government building burnt or destroyed, PB= 
private buildinds burnt/destroyed, MTV= motor vehicle burnt or destroyed, MC=motor cycles burnt/destroyed, 
MSQ= mosque burnt/destroyed, CH= churches burnt/destroyed, PO/PA=police/para-military outpost burnt or 
destroyed, BNK=banks burnt/destroyed, SHP=number of shops burnt/destroyed, MKT= number of markets 
burnt/destroyed. 
Table I, revealed that from 2009 to Oct. 2014, konduga LGA area recorded a total number of 7,166 
deaths comprising 6,994 males and 172 females arising from insurgency. During the same period, the number of 
people missing from tshe local government area was 800 (753 male and 47 female). The estimated number 
livestock killed or stolen wa 2,251 (these include cattle, sheep, goats). Two major markets and about 64 shops 
were destroyed. The markets include those in konduga town and kauri village. In kauri village, all herds 
belonging to the villagers were carted away by the invaders.  
Maiduguri metropolitan council the capital of Borno State lost an estimated number of 6,491 people: 
6,310 were males and 181 females. During the period under review Tashan Baga fish market and about 280 
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shops were burnt. These shops include those along Lagos bridge, custom round about and Baban layi. 
Information on the number of individual’s missing was not readily available. Though, unaccounted for, many 
young boys left the town when the civilian JTF started picking suspected members of the particular religious 
sect. Most of the 280 shops burnt were largely grain and provision shops. The average capacity of a grain shop is 
800-1000 bags. According to the victims, most of them had just taken delivery of new consignment when the 
market was set ablaze. In the same vain, four un-offloaded tanker Lorries were burnt along with the shops. 
Quantifying the losses incurred, in Tashan Baga Market, Mallam Babagana, the market spokes person said that 
property worth between one to two billion naira was lost to insurgency. Also in MMC, the Boko Haram 
insurgency also led to the burning of 155 buildings. Most affected were government buildings such as  schools 
and State electoral commission offices. About 94 mosques and 29 churches where burnt within the periods under 
review. 
In Bama local government area 6,038 people lost their lives to insurgency. Out of this number 5,946 
were males and 92 females. All the shops situated along Bama/ Banki road by Bama main market were burnt 
down along side with the market. About 216 people were unaccounted for. This is made up of 113 males and 
103 females. The two big markets burnt down were the popular market in Banki and Baga main market.  Most of 
the people unaccounted for were from villages in Gulumba, Darajamal, Banki and Soye. One Koranic teacher 
Mal. Modu Soye said that his students (Almajirai) numbering 83 were taken away by the insurgents. 
The data collected from the leaders of Igbo and Yoruba communities in Maiduguri indicated that about 
70% of the Igbo’s residing in Maiduguri sold off their properties and left. In the same vain, 55-60% of the 
Yorubas had also migrated out of the State. Other minority non-indigenes also left the town as a result of the 
killings and destruction of properties. However, with the formation of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), majority 
of those that fled the city are trickling back to the State. As a result Maiduguri Metropolitan Council is 
witnessing considerable influx of displaced person’s from annexed towns and villages. This of course had put 
pressure on the existing facilities and the budget of the council.  
 
3.3 Effect of Insurgency on Grain Market 
The effect of religious insurgency on the Borno state grain market was captured from the trend of business 
before and during the insurgency. It is noteworthy that only two major grain markets were sampled, ( Gamboru 
and Tashan Baga grain markets).  
The Gamboru grain market collects variety of grains from sources that extend into neighboring 
countries. Major grains from these sources include maize, beans and sesame-seeds. The flow of grain to and 
from Borno and her international neighbors was greatly hampered by insurgency in the North eastern part of 
Nigeria. The grain flow is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Grains flow from Gamboru market to Neighboring Countries (2008-20015) in tonnes 
ITEMS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Maize 33,600 35,000 31,000 28,500 25,000 20,000 16,000 
Millet 5,040 7,500 8,200 6,000 5,200 3,600 3,600 
Beans 88,200 82,000 80,000 72,000 64,000 43,000 21,000 
Sorghum 27,300 30,000 24,000 19,000 20,000 15,200 7,000 
Total 154,140 154,500 143,200 125,500 114,200 81,800 47,600 
Source: Field Survey, 2014 
Table 2 revealed that in 2008, an estimated 33,600 tonnes of maize flowed in and out of Gamboru en 
route sub markets in the hinterland. The quantity of the commodity that flow through the market decreased over 
the years from 35,000 tones in 2009 to 16,000 tones in 2014. Also, the flow of millet substantially reduced 
during the periods of 2008-2014. Cumulative grain flow from Gamboru market indicated that before the 
escalation of insurgency in 2009, the estimated grain flow was 154,500 tonnes. However, during insurgency, it 
reduced to 47,600 tones. A substantial chunk of these grains comes through Boko Haram annexed communities 
of Baga, Dabar masara, Monguno and Gubio.  
The Baga market noted for transaction in grains and cereal products was also greatly affected by 
religious insurgency. Located within the city of Maiduguri, it serves as the gate way to other parts of the country 
for items like Maize, Sorghum-vulgare, sorghum-bicolour, millet and beans. Grain flow to/from Baga grain 
market is presented in table III. 
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Table 3: Grain flow from Baga market to Neighboring Countries (2008-20015) in tonnes 
ITEMS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Maize 38,400 38,600 30,200 24,500 16,700 15,900 13,000 
Millet 18,900 22,000 16,500 14,000 12,600 7,000 3,700 
Beans 58,300 52,900 43,000 45,000 33,000 30,000 16,000 
Sorghum 25,200 21,000 19,000 22,000 16,000 14,000 14,200 
Total 140,800 134,500 108,700 105,500 78,300 66,900 46,900 
Source: Field Survey. 2014 
Table 3 showed that in 2008, the flow of Maize, Millet, Beans and Sorghum to and from Baga grain 
market was 38,400, 18,900, 58,300 and 25,200 tones respectively. In 2009, the flow of grain to and from the 
market witnessed minimal increase in maize flow. Maize transaction in the market rose from 38,400 to 38,600. 
However, there was considerable decrease in millet, beans and sorghum demand and supply from the market. At 
the peak of the insurgent activities, maize flow through the Baga market decreased from 38,600 to 13,000 
between 2009 and 2014. Also sorghum decreased from 21,000 tonnes to 14,200 tonnes. Cumulatively, in 2009, 
the total grain flow through the market stood at 134,500 tonnes. As the insurgency increased in tempo, it 
decreased to about 46,900 tonnes in 2014. 
Tables 2 and 3showed that activities in both markets sampled ( Baga and Gomboru grain market) was 
greatly affected by insurgency. The grain sold in these markets are mostly sourced from Tchad, Cameroon, and 
Niger and transported through the various local government areas which is annexed and controlled by the 
insurgents. Thus, movement of traders and their wares through these routes became practically impossible. 




From 2008 to Oct 2014, a total of 28,209 people were victims of religion induced death; this is made up of 
27,469 male and 740 females. The number of people either missing or abducted stood at 2,751. These include 
1,858 Male and 893 females. Most of the people killed, missing or abducted were within the ages of 12-40 years. 
The result revealed that the victims are mostly in their productive years. The number of markets and shops burnt 
during the period under review was 80 and 576 respectively. Quite a number of buildings were also destroyed. 
The number of public and private buildings, Mosque and Churches burnt by insurgents was 1,039; 50,135; 187 
and 88 respectively.  
The contributions of non-indigenes to the economic growth and development of the State over the 
years has been commendable. There is no LGA in the state where economic activities is devoid of non-indigenes 
participation. The State and Local Government has on their workforce considerable number of people from other 
States of the federation. Thus their relocation to other States as a result of the insurgency contributed negatively 
to the State’ economic wellbeing. For example, 90% of the shops along Ahmadu Bello Way, Abaganaram, 
Budum, Kumshe, Gwange London ciki were rented by non-indigenes particularly the Ibos. The Baga, Gamboru 
Ngala, Biu, Damboa etc fish/livestock markets, is assemblage of all ethic groups in Nigeria. The abandonment of 
this shops/markets reduced household incomes of the people and tax revenue accruable to the government. In 
addition, some of the shop owners employed local boys/girls as assistants. These local boys/girls lost the jobs 
due to the relocation of their benefactors (shop owners). 
An estimated number of livestock either stolen or killed during the period under review stood at 
18,465. These include cattle, goat and sheep. This figure excludes those hijacked en-route to hinterlands (Lagos, 
Onitsha, Aba etc). About 2,453 cars and 72,052 motor cycles were burnt down. The public and private buildings 
destroyed stood at 1,039 and 50,135 respectively. While the estimated number of mosques and churches 
destroyed was 187 and 88 respectively. 
The grain market in Baga and Gomburu witnessed considerable decrease in flow of grain. In 2008 
prior to intense Boko Haram activities, both markets had boisterous business activities. An estimated 294,940 
tonnes of grain passed through the market in contrast to only 148,700 tonnes in 2013. The multiplier effects of 
these losses transcends beyond the State to other States of the federation. 
 
3.4 Control of Insurgency  
Every society adopts variety of methods at tackling insurgency suitable to the environment and prevailing 
circumstances. Metz (2007) opined that it may not be possible to defeat insurgency but rather conflict resolution. 
He adduced that conflict resolution is the better option than outright war. He is of the view that the quest to 
defeat insurgency through military could lead to protracted conflict which would further compound existing 
problems. This is more so where the insurgents does not adopt open confrontations rather, guerrilla tactics. It 
could also be worsened where key elites and organization that have vested interest in sustaining insurgency. In 
his contribution to insurgency control, Ruys (2004) suggested that rural development and ensuring sustainability 
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of economic growth and development is the quickest means of controlling insurgency. As much as these are 
attained, there is also the need to have in place well trained security personal. In addition, provision equipment to 
the military and other security apparatus.  
 
4. Summary 
The killing and abduction of productive youths, the exodus of vibrant businessmen and women, the unemployed 
arable land has direct bearing on the economy of the State. Farm lands that are left uncultivated for about 5 years 
contributed to food insecurity in the State as well as the reduction in grain eports to neighboring countries 
(especially Tchad). For instance, the huge Chad Basin Agricultural project that was abandoned led to non-
fulfillment of the Borno State triple “R” initiative (Rehabilitation, Resuscitation, Restoration) of Chad Basin. 
The fulfillment of triple “R” made the State Government to cultivate wheat on 5,000 hectares of land in 2013 of 
which only 30% was harvested. 
The burning of famous Baga fish market and displacement of fishermen in Baga town affected the 
household income of fishermen. Most affected are riverine LGA i.e Ngala, Marte, Abadam, Monguno, and 
Kukawa. These LGAs produced the bulk of fish sold in Borno State in particular and Nigeria in general.  
On the international front, both the domestic grain market that enjoyed tremendous patronage from 
Tchad, Niger and Cameroon witnessed considerable low patronage, It was well documented in Balami (2009), 
that Borno State livestock requirements for consumption and supply to other States were made possible by 
import from neighboring countries. These trades routs are completely cut-off, as most of the border towns are 
under the control of insurgents. Hence decrease in the inflow of livestock.     
Religious insurgency also affected the education sector in Borno State. Public schools were closed 
down for about ten months. Prior to the closure of schools, almost all the schools outside Maiduguri 
Metropolitan Council (MMC), Jere and Biu were either vandalized or burnt down. Those left were empty due to 
none availability of students, perhaps, in compliance with the orders issued by the insurgents not to attend 
western education schools. 
The health sector was also affected as most hospitals in the rural areas were vandalized. In several 
cases, some of the health centers had their personnel kidnapped and transformed to insurgent’s medics. Parents 
of kidnapped/ missing and dead children and relatives developed all sorts of ailment (i.e high blood pressure). 
There has also been a widely reported case of the outbreak of diseases in the internally displaced person’s camps. 
The management of these problems affected the budget for other critical sectors of the State. For instance, 
redirecting funds allocated for road construction to the maintenance of the IDPs and other related security issues.  
On tourism, Borno State can boast of viable tourist attraction centres/activities. These include the great 
Wabi Fort, Durbar Festivities, Biu/Gwoza Mountain etc. Prior to Boko Haram insurgency, people from all works 
of life visited these places for leisure and site seeing. They came with resources; spent them on local markets i.e 
hotels, transports, guards and guides etc. However, the fear of possible abduction or being killed reduced 
activities of the sector and subsequently reducing the income from the sector.  
 
5. Recommendations 
Justice and Equity 
A normal society attains normalcy by upholding law and justice. Equity in all spheres of human endeavor 
guarantees that every individual remain better off commensurate to his/her social strata. It therefore beholds that 
frustration induced rebellion; insurgency, terrorism or even petty crime could be contained through equitable 
distribution of wealth. Equitable distribution of wealth means direction of resource to priority areas with a view 
of regenerating benefit. For instance, what is the sense in spending billions of naira in sponsoring of 
Muslim/Christian pilgrimage amidst of multitude of beggars poorly developed rural areas, unprecedented 
number of unemployed youths amongst others. If the amount is invested in, say, dry season farming, lots of 
people would be employed, food security would be guaranteed, and house hold income would increase. The 
multiplier effect would be positive to the economy. 
Religious Preaching 
Religion is a very sensitive issue in Nigeria, hence every government tend to tread with absolute caution when 
dealing with it. However, the rule of government is to protect and defend the sanctity of her citizens irrespective 
of tribal/religious inclination. However, adherent religious leaders preach hatred, incite followers against others 
religious belief. Authorities for fear of the unknown look elsewhere. Peaceful co-existence is what every religion 
recommends, therefore any person or group of persons who for some reasons decide to do otherwise should be 
prosecuted accordingly. There is the need to give more legal powers to existing recognized religious bodies/legal 
institutions to regulate the activities of preachers. This becomes necessary because, nowadays, dubious people 
use religion to advance their socio-economic interest. 
Training, Retaining and Equipping the Military, Paramilitary and the Police 
General Sani Abatcha once said that if “insurgency last beyond twenty-four (24) hours, the government is 
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interested”. This quote in subject to many interpretations, however, the study will prefer the subtle one. The 
interest here may not necessary mean direct approval but inability to provide adequate human and material 
resources to fight insurgency. That the insurgency in the North east lasted this long is largely attributable to 
under-trained, ill-equipped military/paramilitary personal. Government should ensure that the military personal 
are adequately trained and equipped with modern weaponry. 
Recruitment of the Military/Police Personnel 
The unemployment level in Nigeria has forced a lot of young men/women who ordinary would not want to be 
associated with the military or police to join the profession. This group of people aside from the fact that they 
joined the “force” in the absence of their preferred job, lack the courage to carry arm and fight for the country. 
For instance, during one of the insurgents raid in Maiduguri while the soldiers were removing their military 
uniform, throwing away their guns, the civilian joint task force with stick, cutlass and locally made den-guns ran 
after the insurgents. They even captured so many and handed them over to the runaway military. The message 
here is that government should recruit those that have the courage, zeal and above all patriotism to the military 
and police. 
Public and Private Participation 
We are living in a society where people believe that every activity that advances the well being of the people 
must be carried out by the government. Every citizen has civil responsibility to the State. We expect the 
government to identify criminals in our neighborhood, fix deliberately blocked sewages and provide other social 
amenities. Citizens should partner with the government to eradicate anti-social vices, launch community oriented 
projects etc thereby improving the standard of living. 
Internally Displaced Persons Camp (Refugee Camp) 
The handling of displaced people was not properly coordinated at the initial stage-thus making it difficult to 
organize welfare packages for them. Though agencies like NEMA has being in existence for quite some time, the 
level of preparedness was exposed during the monumental influx of displaced people from annexed villages in 
Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Government in collaboration with non-governmental organizations should be 
proactive at tackling un-anticipated occurrences. 
Finally, re-settlement of the displaced people back to their wards and villages should be done in phases. 
Phases one, is to secure the place, ensure the land and field are cleared of landmines, un-exploded bombs, 
weapons left by run away or dead insurgents etc. The second phase is rebuilding of damaged institutions that is 
schools, hospitals, mosques and churches. This also includes financial help to those whose houses are burnt or 
destroyed. Government can solicit help from internationally acclaimed non-governmental organizations, 
Multinational corporations, religious organizations etc. The third phase is provision of farm implements for both 
the dry/rainy season. While doing this, enough relief material should be given to victims to sustain them through 
the gestation period of farm input. The final phase is transporting victims back to their place of abode. Largely 
due to uncertainties returnees would encounter, government should attach medics and psychologists to provide 
prompt medical/psychological attention to traumatized people.      
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